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Available online 5 November 2015Knowing what we don't yet know is critical for learning. Nonetheless, people typically overestimate their
prowess—but is this true of everyone? Three studies examined who shows overconﬁdence and why. Study 1
demonstrated that participantswith an entity (ﬁxed) theory of intelligence, those known to avoid negative infor-
mation, showed signiﬁcantly more overconﬁdence than those with more incremental (malleable) theories. In
Study 2, participants who were taught an entity theory of intelligence allocated less attention to difﬁcult prob-
lems than those taught an incremental theory. Participants in this entity condition also displayed more overcon-
ﬁdence than those in the incremental condition, and this difference in overconﬁdence was mediated by the
observed bias in attention to difﬁcult problems. Finally, in Study 3, directing participants' attention to difﬁcult as-
pects of the task reduced the overconﬁdence of those with more entity views of intelligence. Implications for re-
ducing biased self-assessments that can interfere with learning were discussed.
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Metacognition1. Introduction
Learning any new task requires understanding the gap between
what one currently knows and what one hopes or needs to know.
While such self-insight is valuable, a wealth of research suggests that
it is often elusive. Self-assessments often correlate poorlywith objective
measures of skill in a variety of domains, such as intellectual abilities
(e.g., Borkenau & Lieber, 1992), social skills (e.g., DePaulo et al., 1997),itute of Education Sciences, U.S.
o Washington State University.
do not represent views of the
, Washington State University,and job performance (e.g., Bass & Yammarino, 1991; for a review, see
Dunning, 2005). Most examples of error-prone self-assessment reveal
overconﬁdence. Indeed, a perusal of the conﬁdence literature can
lead one to fear crossing the street as users of nearly every mode of
transportation display overconﬁdence. Drivers (Marttoli & Richardson,
1998), motorcyclists (Rutter et al., 1998), and even bungee jumpers
(Middleton et al., 1996) tend to overestimate their ability to travel safely
in their preferred manner.
Overconﬁdence carries important consequences. For example, over-
conﬁdence often leads students to make poor study choices and, conse-
quently, impedes learning (Dunlosky & Rawson, 2012). Furthermore,
one person's overconﬁdence can carry signiﬁcant consequences for
others. People base important health and ﬁnancial decisions on advice
offered by doctors and lawyers. This practice seems suspect in light of
evidence that both doctors (Tracey et al., 1997) and lawyers (Loftus &
1 No participants were excluded from analyses across the three studies. We used a rule
of thumb of 25 participants per cell to determine the sample size for Studies 1 and 3. Each
sample is slightly larger than planned because of imperfect enforcement of the stopping
rule. For Study 2, we doubled our rule of thumb for a goal of 50 participants per cell to en-
sure sufﬁcient power for themediational analyses. Study 2 has slightly fewer than 50 par-
ticipants per cell because our access to participants had ended for the semester.
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related knowledge and skills. It therefore seems crucial that researchers
understand the roots of overconﬁdence in order to devise strategies for
improving self-insight.
In the present paper, we seek to better understand a speciﬁc type of
overconﬁdence—overplacement. Overplacement refers to overly posi-
tive perceptions of how one compares to others (Moore & Healy,
2008). Past research suggests that overplacement stems, in part, from
the desire to view the self positively (Blanton et al., 2001). However,
there is often an indirect path from this self-enhancement goal to
overconﬁdence in self-assessments. It would be hard to truly believe
that one is brilliant based only on the fact that this belief feels nice to
maintain. Instead, motivated processes are likely to be most effective
when they are hidden from view (Gilovich, 1991). Thus, self-
enhancement motives often inﬂuence self-judgments indirectly by
shaping the way that we attend to, interpret, and remember informa-
tion (Kunda, 1990).
Little is known about who is most overconﬁdent and why. In this
paper, we draw from the literature on theories of intelligence to identify
the very individuals who might be most likely to self-enhance and, as a
result, to show themost overconﬁdence. Past research suggests that the
tendencies to avoid difﬁculty and react poorly to challenge are more
characteristic of people holding one theory of intelligence over another
(e.g., Hong et al., 1999, Nussbaum&Dweck, 2008).We examinewheth-
er overconﬁdence ismost prevalent among thosewhose theory of intel-
ligence leads them to forego learning opportunities in order tomaintain
positive beliefs regarding their competence. Moreover, we build on this
literature to propose a novel contributor to overconﬁdence—a biased
tendency to allocate attention away fromdifﬁculty. Indeed, wewill pro-
pose that people holding one intelligence theorymay account formuch,
if not most, of the overconﬁdence effect.
Some people hold a more incremental view of intelligence—
characterized by the belief that intelligence is malleable and can be de-
veloped over time—while others hold amore entity view—characterized
by the belief that intelligence is ﬁxed and unchangeable (for reviews,
see Dweck, 1999, 2006). We predict that people's beliefs about
intelligence will impact the degree to which they engage in self-
enhancing behavior, as opposed to behavior that indicates greater
openness to negative information (cf. Leonardelli & Laken, 2010 for a re-
lated idea). We know from past research that incremental theorists' be-
lief that they can improve their intelligence leads them to adopt
learning goals in which they strive to improve their abilities (Dweck &
Leggett, 1988). This orientation toward learning, we argue, should
make incremental theorists open to both positive and negative feed-
back, which should result in relatively accurate views of the self. In con-
trast, entity theorists' belief that intelligence isﬁxed leads them to adopt
goals characterized by efforts to validate, rather than improve, their in-
telligence (Nussbaum & Dweck, 2008). We argue that this orientation
will leave entity theorists with greater motivation to maintain positive
views of their intelligence compared to incremental theorists. As such,
entity theorists may engage in acts that leave them feeling (over)conﬁ-
dent more often than their incremental theory peers. Building on this
work, we suggest that entity theorists will seek to maintain overly pos-
itive self-views by means of preferential attention to the experiences of
implicit positive feedback and ease compared to experiences of effort
and difﬁculty.
Prior research offers preliminary evidence that the perception of a
trait asﬁxedmight inspire avoidance of negative feedback. For example,
Dunning (1995) demonstrated that participants who had performed
poorly on a test of a purportedly ﬁxed trait showed less interest in addi-
tional feedback compared to participants who had performed well. An
entity theory of intelligence also promotes lessened attention to explicit
corrective feedback or errors, compared to an incremental theory
(e.g., Mangels et al., 2006).
The current investigation builds on this work to illuminate a previ-
ously unknown mechanism that might contribute to differences inoverconﬁdence. We examine whether motivations to avoid negative
feedbackmight lead entity theorists to allocate less attention to difﬁcult
problems and more attention to easy problems on intellectual tasks,
compared to incremental theorists. No research has previously explored
how attention allocation might inﬂuence overconﬁdence. We examine
whether this biased pattern of attention allocation leaves entity theo-
rists with more overconﬁdent self-assessments than their incremental
theorist peers. We focus on people's attention to the immediate self-
generated feedback from feelings of ease or difﬁculty, understanding
or confusion, rather than explicit feedback regarding success or failure.
Facing difﬁculty while completing a task can serve as a cue that one is
performing poorly, constituting implicit failure feedback. Similarly, ex-
periences of ease when performing a task serve as implicit cues that
one is succeeding or performing quite well. Indeed, superﬁcial manipu-
lations designed to inspire feelings of difﬁculty leave entity theorists,
but not incremental theorists, feeling less conﬁdent about their perfor-
mance (Miele &Molden, 2010). As such,we suggest that entity theorists
are likely to avoid difﬁcult aspects of tasks that might require them to
face up to the possibility that they are not performing well and, by ex-
tension, might not be smart. In short, relative to incremental theorists,
we expect that entity theorists will allocate their attention in motivated
ways—toward easy task aspects and away from difﬁcult task
aspects—and that, as a result, they will hold overconﬁdent beliefs re-
garding how well they have performed on an intellectual task.
2. The present investigation
The present research explores who shows overconﬁdence and why.
Study 1 examines whether those with more of an entity theory show
greater overplacement (overestimation of their percentile score) than
those with stronger incremental theories. Study 2 experimentally ma-
nipulates intelligence theories and examines whether a biased pattern
of attention allocation mediates a tendency for greater overplacement
in the entity compared to the incremental condition. Finally, Study 3
features a manipulation of participants' attention allocation to examine
whether directing attention to difﬁcult items eliminates the
overplacement effect among entity theorists.
3. Study 1: intelligence theories and overconﬁdence
Study 1 addressed the relationship between theories of intelligence
and overconﬁdence.We predicted that participantswith stronger entity
views would account for much of the commonly found pattern of
overplacement.
3.1. Methods
3.1.1. Participants
Fifty-three1 university students participated in exchange for extra
credit in their psychology courses (62% female).
3.1.2. Procedure
Several days before the main experiment, participants completed a
web-based 8-item measure of their theories of intelligence (Dweck,
1999). They rated their agreement with statements such as “You have
a certain amount of intelligence, and you can't really domuch to change
it” and “You can always substantially change how intelligent you are” on
a 6-point scale from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.”
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choice test of antonym problems. Test items were selected from a GRE
test preparation guide (Educational Testing Service, 1996) with the
goal of creating a test that was ofmoderate difﬁculty (see Supplementa-
ry Material). Upon completing the test, participants were asked to indi-
cate their conﬁdence by rating how their performance compared to that
of other participants in the study. Speciﬁcally, they were asked to esti-
mate their percentile score by choosing a number between 0% (worse
than all other students) and 99% (better than all others). The 50th per-
centile was described as representing the average performance of all
students from that university participating in the study during that
semester. It is worth noting that this procedure allows for greater preci-
sion than the measures more commonly used to assess overplacement.
Participants in many overplacement studies are asked to rate how their
traits or abilities compare to those of the average person. These studies
include no objective measure of those traits or abilities to serve as a
basis of comparison. Our strategy of including measures of subjective
and objective performance on an intellectual task provides the
information necessary to identify precisely which participants are
overconﬁdent.
3.2. Results and discussion
We ﬁrst examined whether our sample, on average, was overconﬁ-
dent and found that it was. A paired t-test demonstrated that the aver-
age estimate,M=66.19 (SE=2.87), was signiﬁcantly greater than the
true average score, M = 50.0 (SE = 3.86), t(52) = 3.73, p b .001,
d=0.75.
We next calculated a theory of intelligence score for each participant
by averaging across responses to the eight items, reverse scoring as nec-
essary. Scores can theoretically range from 1 (strong agreementwith an
entity theory of intelligence) to 6 (strong agreement with an incremen-
tal theory). The mean score in this sample was 3.44 (SE = 0.12) (see
Supplementary Material).
To examine the relationship between intelligence theories and over-
conﬁdence, we conducted a regression analysis predicting participants'
conﬁdence estimate from their intelligence theory score, controlling for
their actual percentile score.2 This analysis revealed that participants
with more entity views of intelligence offered more overconﬁdent esti-
mates than participants who more strongly endorsed an incremental
theory, β = −.51, t(50) = −4.27, p b .001, see Fig. 1.3 Participants
with stronger entity theories clearly displayed overconﬁdence, estimat-
ing their performance to be in the 76th percentile,M=76.78, SE=3.49.
In contrast, those with stronger incremental theories offered estimates
that weremore accurate,M=55.59, SE=3.49. Study 1 offers initial ev-
idence that overconﬁdence, typically thought to be a general phenome-
non, might be most common among entity theorists.
4. Study 2: theories of intelligence and attention allocation
Study 2 was designed to explore a novel mechanism underlying the
relationship between theories of intelligence and overconﬁdence—
differences in how people allocate attention to different aspects of a
task. We argue that an entity theory might lead participants to allocate
their time in a biased way—toward the experiences of ease on2 In all analyses predicting estimatedpercentile scores, we control for participants' actu-
al scores.We do this because percentile estimates have a ceiling of 100. Thus, an individual
scoring in the 95th percentile can be, at most, overconﬁdent by 5 percentile points while
lower-scoring individuals are able to display much more overconﬁdence. Controlling for
participants' actual score allows us to avoid an artiﬁcial appearance of differences in over-
conﬁdence that are a direct result of participants' actual score.
3 Note that lower intelligence theories scores correspond with stronger entity views of
intelligence. Across all studies, there were no interactions between gender and intelli-
gence theories on overconﬁdence (see Supplementary Material).intellectual tasks generated while answering easy questions and away
from the feelings of difﬁculty characteristic of attempting difﬁcult ques-
tions. In contrast, those with more incremental theories might allocate
their time in ways less driven by a motivation to avoid difﬁculty. Fur-
ther, we argue that entity theorists' biased pattern of attention alloca-
tion is likely to lead them to be more overconﬁdent than incremental
theorists.
Studies 2 and 3 were designed as a two-step experimental test of
causal mediation as recommended by Spencer et al. (2005). This ap-
proach requires one experiment in which the proposed independent
variable (i.e., participants' intelligence theories) is manipulated in
order to assess its impact on the proposed mediator(s) (time devoted
to completing easy and difﬁcult questions) and dependent measure
(conﬁdence). Combined with the second step in Study 3—an experi-
mental manipulation of the proposed mediator designed to examine
its impact on the dependent variable—this approach can provide strong
evidence of causal mediation.
Consistent with this approach, Study 2 directly examined the causal
relationship between intelligence theories, attention allocation, and
overconﬁdence (or, more precisely, overplacement) by experimentally
manipulating participants' intelligence theories. We predicted that
those in the entity theory condition would devote less time to difﬁcult
aspects of the task and more time to easy aspects compared to those
in the incremental condition. We also expected that those in the entity
condition would show greater overconﬁdence than those in the incre-
mental condition. Finally we predicted that a difference in attention al-
located to difﬁcult and easy problems would mediate the relationship
between intelligence theories and overconﬁdence.4.1. Methods
4.1.1. Participants
Ninety-four university students participated in exchange for extra
credit or a cash payment (61% female).4.1.2. Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to read one of two popular sci-
ence news-style articles successfully used in past research to experi-
mentally manipulate theories of intelligence (e.g., Hong et al., 1999).
They were asked to read the article in order to help with research on
reading comprehension. Participants randomly assigned to the Incre-
mental Article condition read an article designed to convey to them
that intelligence is malleable. This article described “scientiﬁc evidence”
from cross-sectional research and twin studies supporting this mallea-
ble view of intelligence. Those in the Entity Article condition read an ar-
ticle written in the same style but purporting to offer scientiﬁc support
for the conclusion that intelligence cannot be shaped.
As part of a “second study,” participants were asked to take a test of
antonym problems similar to that in Study 1. We created this 15-item
test using item difﬁculty data provided by the GRE preparation guide
described above (see Supplementary Material). We selected ﬁve ques-
tions likely to be relatively easy for our sample, ﬁve questions likely to
be very difﬁcult, and ﬁve ﬁller items likely to be of moderate difﬁculty.
The computer interface presented one test item per page and tracked
the time that participants spent on each problem. Participants were
given unlimited time to complete the test. A navigation bar at the bot-
tom of each page allowed them to move on to additional questions as
well as return to any previously displayed questions and change their
answers if they wished. In this way, participants could devote as much
time as they liked to completing test problems and going back to review
their responses atwill, much as they can on the pen and paper tests that
are common in educational settings. Upon completing the test, partici-
pantswere asked to estimate their percentile score using the samemea-
sure as in Study 1.
Fig. 1. The effect of naturally occurring (Studies 1 and 3) andmanipulated (Study 2) theo-
ries of intelligence on overconﬁdence. Note: The means displayed in this ﬁgure represent
difference scores between participants' average conﬁdence judgments and actual scores,
estimated from analyses that control for actual score. Themeans in Studies 1 and 3 repre-
sent one standard deviation above (incremental theorists) and below (entity theorists)
themean on intelligence theories. Study 2 showsmeans for participants in the Incremen-
tal and Entity Article conditions. Error bars represent 1 SE. Also note that, in Study 3, one
condition oriented participants' attention toward easier problems and the other oriented
their attention toward difﬁcult ones (a manipulation designed to eliminate the overconﬁ-
dence of entity theorists).
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4.2.1. Item difﬁculty
A paired t-test conﬁrmed that participants answered a higher per-
centage of the easy test items correctly, M = 96.81 (SE = .87)
range = 90.4%–98.9%, than the difﬁcult test items, M = 47.87 (SE =
2.73) range = 29.79%–71.28%, t(94) = 18.73, p b .001, d= 2.42.
4.2.2. Attention allocation
We next examined the time in seconds that participants spent on
easy items, difﬁcult items, and on the 15-item test as a whole. Data
were log-transformed to correct for positive skew (see Supplementary
Material). We then computed two composite scores representing the
mean log-transformed seconds spent on difﬁcult items and, separately,
the mean log-transformed seconds spent on easy items. Finally, we
summed the time that participants devoted to each item and calculated
the log-transformed total number of seconds taken to complete the test.
To test our prediction about attention allocation, we conducted a
mixed-model ANCOVA predicting participants' time on easy and difﬁ-
cult items from their article condition, controlling for the overall time
taken to complete the test.4 This analysis revealed the predicted interac-
tion between article condition and attention allocated to easy and
difﬁculty items, F(1,91) = 13.13, p b .001, ηp2 = 0.13. To aid in interpre-
tation, we converted the log-transformed means resulting from our
analyses into rawmeans representing the number of seconds allocated
to problems. Simple effect analyses suggested that participants in the
Entity Article condition allocated signiﬁcantly less attention toward dif-
ﬁcult items,M=15.70 (SE=1.026), than those in the Incremental Arti-
cle condition,M=17.22 (SE=1.023), F(1,91)=6.48, p b .05, ηp2=0.07.
In addition to attending less to difﬁcult items, Entity Article participants
allocatedmore attention to easy items,M=20.94 (SE=1.028), than In-
cremental Article participants,M= 18.54 (SE= 1.026), F(1,91) = 9.22,4 The overall time that participants spent on the antonym test in Study 2 ranged from
159 to 929 s. We thought it important to control for participants' overall test time in all
analyses predicting attention allocation because test time likely correlates with individual
differences (e.g., inmotivation, verbal ability, and/or conscientiousness) that are irrelevant
to the central questions of this paper.p b .005, ηp2 = 0.09. In both conditions, participants allocated more time
to easy than difﬁcult items. However, this differencewas onlymarginal-
ly signiﬁcant for participants in the Incremental Article condition,
F(1,91) = 3.29, p b .10, ηp2 = 0.04. In contrast, the large effect size
displayed by participants in the Entity Article condition, F(1,91) =
43.36, p b .001, ηp2 = 0.32, was more than 8 times the size of the effect
observed in the Incremental condition.
4.2.3. Overconﬁdence
Was this difference in allocation of attention accompanied by a dif-
ference in overconﬁdence? To answer this question, we conducted an
ANCOVA with participants' intelligence article condition predicting
their estimated percentile score, controlling for participants' actual
score. This analysis revealed a main effect suggesting that participants
in the Entity Article condition offered more overconﬁdent estimates of
their percentile score, M = 68.80 (SE = 2.32), than did Incremental
Article participants, M = 59.31 (SE = 2.13), F(1,91) = 9.03, p b .005,
ηp2 = 0.09, see Fig. 1.
4.2.4. Mediation
Finally, we used Hayes' (2013) Process script, Model 4, to run a bias-
corrected bootstrapping analysis based on 10,000 samples examining
whether differences in attention allocation to easy and difﬁcult items
(entered as separate, parallel mediators) mediated this observed effect
of article condition on participants' estimated percentile score. Partici-
pants' total time to complete the test as well as their actual percentile
score were added to the model as covariates. Consistent with the anal-
ysis above, we found a direct effect of article condition on conﬁdence,
ab =−11.19 (SE= 3.21), t(93) =−3.49, p b .001 (−17.57,−4.81).
This analysis also revealed a conﬁdence interval for the indirect effect
of the article condition on participants' conﬁdence estimates through
attention to difﬁcult problems (ab1 = 1.79, SE= 1.25) that was above
zero (0.12, 5.44, see Fig. 2). In contrast, the conﬁdence interval for the
indirect effect of condition on conﬁdence through attention to easy
problems (ab2=0.17, SE=1.28) contained zero (−1.89, 3.52). Together,
these analyses provide support for our hypothesis that participants in the
Entity Article condition show greater overconﬁdence than those in the
Incremental condition, in part, because those in the Entity condition allo-
cated less attention to difﬁcult items than their peers in the Incremental
condition.
By experimentally manipulating participants' theories of intelli-
gence, Study 2 provides evidence of a causal relationship between an
entity view of intelligence and overconﬁdence. Further, Study 2 pro-
vides insight into a mechanism underlying this relationship. Partici-
pants in the Entity condition allocated less time to difﬁcult problems
andmore time to easy problems than those in the Incremental condition.
Further, bootstrapping analysis suggests that this effect of article condi-
tion on overconﬁdence was mediated by differences in allocation of
time to difﬁcult (but not easy) problems. In light of evidence that, across
many domains, bad is stronger than good (Baumeister et al., 2001), it is
perhaps not surprising that differences in attention to a negative stimuli
(the struggle accompanying difﬁcult problems) in this study had a larg-
er impact on overconﬁdence than attention to easy problems.
5. Study 3: manipulating attention
If, as we argue, entity theorists maintain overly positive views of
their performance by directing their attention away from difﬁculty,
we should be able to reduce their overconﬁdence by requiring them
to attend to difﬁcult items. Study 3 builds on the previous study by pro-
viding the second step of the two-step experimental strategy for
assessing mediation promoted by Spencer et al. (2005). This second
step requires experimentally manipulating the proposed mediator in
order to assess its impact on the dependent variable. Following this
recommendation, we manipulated participants' attention to difﬁcult
versus easy aspects of the task and examined the effect of this
Fig. 2. The indirect effects of article condition on overconﬁdence through allocation of at-
tention to difﬁcult and easy problems (Study 2).
Note: The standardized coefﬁcients for each direct effect were drawn from the described
bootstrapping analysis. This analysis revealed an indirect effect of the article condition
on participants' overconﬁdence through attention to difﬁcult items. There was not evi-
dence of a comparable indirect effect through participants' attention to easy items. * indi-
cates p b. 05.
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requiring greater attention to difﬁcult items would reduce or eliminate
the overconﬁdence of entity theorists. However, we did not expect that
this manipulation would inﬂuence the (already accurate) self-
assessments of incremental theorists, because incremental theorists
are less likely than entity theorists to interpret difﬁculty as a reﬂection
of their abilities (Miele & Molden, 2010).
5.1. Methods
5.1.1. Participants
Participantswere 104 university students (56% females)who partic-
ipated in exchange for either a cash payment or credit in their psychol-
ogy course.
5.1.2. Procedure
Participants were asked to complete the 4-item short version of the
Theories of Intelligence scale (Dweck, 1999).5 They then completed a
20-item multiple-choice general knowledge quiz made up of 10 ques-
tions we expected to be quite easy for them and 10 questions expected
to be very challenging (see Supplementary Material). After completing
this test, participants were asked to review each of the 20 items while
completing a task designed to direct their attention either toward easy
more than difﬁcult problems (Attention Toward Ease condition) or to-
ward difﬁcultmore than easy problems (Attention TowardDifﬁculty con-
dition). Speciﬁcally, participants in the Attention Toward Ease condition
were asked to complete a time-consuming task when reviewing easy
items. They were asked to carefully retype the text for each of the 10
easy questions and to proofread their work to ensure that they had cop-
ied the text exactly. However, when reviewing the 10 difﬁcult test ques-
tions, participants in this condition were asked to perform a secondary
task thatwould take very little time—to simply name the text color. Par-
ticipants in the Attention Toward Difﬁculty condition received the oppo-
site direction — to complete the time-consuming task of retyping each
of the 10 difﬁcult test questions and to simply name the text color of
each easy item. After completing this review task, participants were
asked to estimate their percentile score on the test using the samemea-
sure as in the previous studies.
5.2. Results and discussion
To begin, a paired t-test revealed that easy questionswere answered
correctly, on average, 87.2% of the time (SE = 1.12) whereas difﬁcult5 The test used in Study 3 took longer to complete than the tests in the previous studies.
We balanced this longer test with a short measure of intelligence theories.questions were answered correctly only 44.2% of the time (SE= 1.73),
t(103) = 23.16, p b .001, d= 2.35.
Next, we conducted a regression analysis predicting participants'
performance estimates from their condition, intelligence theory, and
the interaction between condition and intelligence theory, controlling
for actual percentile score. This analysis revealed a signiﬁcant interac-
tion between condition and intelligence theory, β = −.68,
t(99)=−2.19, p b .05. Simple slope analyses revealed that, in theAtten-
tion Toward Ease condition, participants with stronger entity views of
intelligence were more overconﬁdent, M = 67.10 (SE = 3.81), than
their more incremental peers, M = 55.66 (SE = 3.81), β = −.30,
t(99) =−2.51, p b .05. However, among those in the Attention Toward
Difﬁculty condition, participants with stronger entity theories were no
more conﬁdent,M= 58.68 (SE= 3.21), than their incremental peers,
M = 61.76 (SE = 3.20), β = .10, t(99) = .67, p = .51. It seems that
the excess conﬁdence that entity theorists enjoyed in the Attention To-
ward Ease condition was missing among their entity counterparts in
the Attention Toward Difﬁculty condition, β= .88, t(99) = 2.21, p b .05.
Consistent with our predictions and with Studies 1 and 2, partici-
pants with more entity theories of intelligence offered more overconﬁ-
dent estimates of their performance than their more incremental peers.
However, Study 3 included a condition that, for the ﬁrst time in this in-
vestigation, led to humility among entity theorists. When participants
with a stronger entity view of intelligence were required to attend to
difﬁcult problems, their conﬁdence came down to the level displayed
by their incremental peers. We ﬁnd this pattern particularly impressive
when compared to the patterns of overconﬁdence in Studies 1 and 2. A
clear pattern can be seen in Fig. 1 whereby entity theorists show greater
overconﬁdence than incremental theorists across each study and in
each condition, with the sole exception of when they are faced with
the Attention Toward Difﬁculty condition in Study 3. These ﬁndings pro-
vide further evidence that entity theorists may maintain overconﬁdent
views, in part, because of a tendency to allocate their attention away
from experiences of difﬁculty.When theywere forced to attend to difﬁ-
culty in Study 3, we saw a signiﬁcant drop in the conﬁdence that was so
plentiful in the earlier studies.
6. General discussion
People tend to display overconﬁdence across many domains
(Dunning, 2005). The present research capitalized on theories of intelli-
gence to illuminate who contributes most to this robust overconﬁdence
effect and to understand the mechanism by which this happens. Across
three studies, we demonstrated that a belief in intelligence as ﬁxed pro-
motes greater overconﬁdence than the opposite belief—that intelli-
gence can be improved. These studies also identiﬁed and offered
important insight into a previously unstudied cause of overconﬁdence.
Study 2 provided evidence that this difference in overconﬁdence
stems, in part, from differences in attention allocation. Participants
who were randomly assigned to a condition in which they were taught
an entity (vs. incremental) view of intelligence subsequently allocated
less time to difﬁcult problems and, as a result, mademore overconﬁdent
assessments of performance. To further establish this mechanism, in
Study 3, we manipulated participants' attention toward more difﬁcult
or toward easier problems. As predicted, when attention was directed
toward easier problems (a condition meant to mimic entity theorists'
natural attention allocation tendencies), those with stronger entity
views of intelligence showed greater overconﬁdence than their more
incremental peers. However, when attention was directed toward difﬁ-
cult problems, the conﬁdence estimates of those with stronger entity
theories fell to the same level as those of their more incremental peers.
Together, these studies provide intriguing new evidence that the
overconﬁdence effect may be less universal than previously thought.
Each study revealed a general overconﬁdence effect, but further analyses
revealed that participants who endorse an entity theory accounted
for the lion's share of that effect. Importantly, this work also offers
99J. Ehrlinger et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 63 (2016) 94–100insight into a previously unknown contributor to overconﬁdence—amo-
tivated pattern of attention allocation that encourages overconﬁdent
perceptions of performance. This ﬁnding furthers our understanding of
how themotivation to self-enhance can foster overconﬁdence indirectly,
through behavioral biases including biased patterns of allocation of at-
tention. Although the overconﬁdence effect was originally thought to
be driven by self-enhancement motives (e.g., Alicke, 1985, Dunning
et al., 1995),much of the recentwork on overconﬁdence has highlighted
non-motivational mechanisms including the competence level needed
to understand one's level of incompetence (e.g., Dunning et al., 2003,
Ehrlinger et al., 2008), reliance on chronic self-views (Ehrlinger &
Dunning, 2003), and the informational differences between the self
and others (Chambers & Windshitl, 2004). This focus on non-
motivational mechanisms inspired Brown (2012) to subtitle a paper
on overconﬁdence “Motives (Still)Matter.” The present investigation re-
veals an important mechanism—biased allocation of attention—through
which motives (still) matter in explaining overconﬁdence.
Although this was not the primary goal of these studies, the present
research also provides intriguing evidence of two effective strategies for
reducing overconﬁdence. As demonstrated in Study 2, one effective
strategy for inspiring improved accuracy in self-assessments is to
teach people an incremental view of intelligence. Recently, researchers
have developed interventions designed to teach incremental views
(aka “growth mindsets”) to improve outcomes in the classroom
(e.g., Blackwell et al., 2007), management (Heslin et al., 2005), and
weight loss (Burnette & Finkel, 2012). One additional beneﬁt of these in-
terventions might be to discourage overconﬁdence and inspire greater
self-insight among intervention recipients. In addition, Study 3 demon-
strates that directing people's attention toward the most difﬁcult as-
pects of a task can inspire more accurate self-assessments among
thosewho typically showed themost overconﬁdence (entity theorists).
Future research could further explore whether interventions that teach
an incremental mindset and/or direct attention to difﬁculty might re-
duce overconﬁdence in the classroom and workplace.
Finally, perhaps the most important avenue for future research is to
explore how the observed differences in attentional practices, and in
overconﬁdence, can illuminate ways to improve students’ and em-
ployees’ learning trajectories. Wewould expect that a tendency to allo-
cate relatively more time toward easy tasks over difﬁcult tasks could
lead to a decrement in sustained learning over time. First, mastery re-
quires time and attention directed speciﬁcally toward those aspects of
a task that aremore difﬁcult (Ericsson et al., 1993). Thus, people's reluc-
tance to focus attention on difﬁcult aspects of a taskmay limit their abil-
ity to improve. In addition, overconﬁdence might keep students from
feeling that they need to devote time toward additional learning
(Finn, 2008; Metcalfe & Finn, 2008). Indeed, past research does suggest
that incremental theorists show greater learning over time, relative to
entity theorists, in the face of academic challenges (Blackwell et al.,
2007). We look forward to future research that examines the degree
to which sustained learning is hindered by patterns of biased attention
allocation and overconﬁdence aswell as research that examinesways of
overcoming these biases.
Appendix A. Supplementary Material
Supplementary material to this article can be found online at http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2015.11.001. Data and experimentalmaterials
can be found online at https://osf.io/fm5c2/.
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